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	 One	 of	 the	 most	 difficult	 intellectual	 problems	 which	
humans have over the ages sought to resolve is the question of 
personal identity. And in disparate philosophical systems, including 
the	African,	 reflections	 on	 personhood	 have	 sometimes	 taken	 an	
ethical	or	religious	turn,	or	both.	For	this	reason,	Bernard	Matolino’s	




the quality of the ideas expressed in it is good. It discusses many 
of the most important concerns and disputes over personhood – 
especially, regarding the ethical foundations of personhood – in 
African	philosophical	thought.	It	is	rather	surprising	that	this	book	
has	not	been	sufficiently	reviewed	by	scholars	or	received	adequate	
attention	 on	 the	 continent,	 although	 Matolino	 is	 a	 well-known	
South African philosopher.
	 Matolino	carries	out	his	discussion	in	five	chapters.	Chapter	
one	 explores	 the	nature	of	personhood	with	 special	 focus	on	 the	
“three	theses”	of	Didier	Kaphagawani	and	the	“two	conceptions”	
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thinking,	Matolino	 suggests	 that	Tempels’	 position	 should	 rather	
be	 understood	 as	 communalist	 (pp.	 7-11).	 On	 Ikuenobe’s	 two	











of life through fortunes of good health and sound social relations” 
(Matolino,	p.	37).	By	sound	social	relations,	the	Bantu	is	expected	
to	lead	an	ethical	life	which	eventually	will	earn	him	a	status	in	the	
community as a person.	This	means	that	personhood	is	an	ethical	
concept.	To	a	large	extent,	nonetheless,	Temples’	explication	of	the	
Bantu	concept	of	being	as	“force”	does	not	only	seem	unjustifiably	
mystical	 to	Matolino	but	 is	also	a	“distortion”	of	Bantu	 thinking	
since	Tempels	does	not	give	any	word	in	Bantu	which	stands	for	
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then,	 is	 both	 a	 “social	 fact”	 and	 a	 “constitutive	 identity”	 of	 the	
individual	(p.	46).	It	is	easy	to	observe	that	this	perspective	on	the	
individual is common among many African cultures, including 
the	Akan.	 The	 prominent	Akan	 philosophers	 Kwasi	Wiredu	 and	
Kwame	Gyekye	express	the	same	ideas	about	Akan	social	set-up	
(Wiredu,	1996,	p.	159;	Gyekye,	1997,	p.	38).	Mbiti	substantially	
maintains	 the	 communitarian	 ideas	of	Temples	 and	 suggests	 that	
even	the	African	kinship	system	encompasses	the	living-dead	(pp.	
51-52).	It	is	noteworthy	that	this	suggestion	about	the	living-dead	







	 The	 metaphysical	 conception	 of	 a	 person	 is	 tackled	 in	
chapter	three	with	particular	focus	on	the	Yoruba	and	Akan	schemes.	
This	conception	is	discussed	as	distinct	from	and	projected	as	equal	
in	 importance	 to	 the	 communitarian	 view	 which	 is	 projected	 in	
some circles as the “authentic” African conception of personhood 
(Matolino,	 pp.	 72,	 75).	 Matolino	 further	 rejects	 the	 attempts	
made	 by	 some	philosophers	 to	 explain	 the	 former	 as	 part	 of	 the	
latter	 (pp.	 77,	 81).	These	 rejections	 set	 the	 tone	 for	Matolino	 to	
analyse	the	selected	metaphysical	schemes	with	clarity.	In	Yoruba	
philosophical thought, the concept of eniyan (person,	as	a	matter	of	
“strict	identity”)	contrasts	with	omoluwabi (person,	as	a	matter	of	
“ethics/sociality”). In terms of the metaphysical sense, eniyan, an 
individual	possesses	spiritual	and	physical	attributes	even	though	
some	parts	of	the	body	are	also	said	to	perform	spiritual	roles;	okan 
(heart)	and	ori (head)	are	examples	 (p.	85).	On	 the	basis	of	 this,	
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Matolino	 questions	 why	 Gyekye	 postulates	 purely	 metaphysical	
entities	 like	 okra (bearer	 of	 life)	 in	Akan	 philosophical	 scheme	
given	that	both	schemes	are	African.	He	writes,	Gyekye’s
characterization	of	the	okra as essentially non-spatial is 










has	some	physical	attributes	and	 is	 thus	quasi-physical	 (pp.	101-
102).	
	 Matolino	 shows	 in	 chapter	 four	 how	 communitarians	 get	
their	argument	wrong.	He	rejects	the	view	that	communitarianism	
is the authentic African perspective on personhood since many 
Africans	like	him	who	do	not	live	in	rural,	traditional	communities	
do	not	have	communitarian	identities	at	all	(p.	134).	On	the	whole,	
communitarianism	 is	 anachronistic	 (p.	 120).	 He	 also	 rejects	




	 One	may,	 however,	wonder	whether	 the	 communitarian’s	
discussion of the ideals of communitarianism suggests that he or 
she	is	oblivious	of	the	current	reality	that	urban	life	does	not	often	
display	 or	 perfectly	 portray	 communitarian	 living,	 as	 Matolino	
claims.	It	does	not		seem	to	me	as	if	the	communitarian	was	seeking	
to thrust a communitarian mode of identity on every African that 
is	seeking	to	define	who	he	or	she	is.	If	the	communitarian	could	
be	understood	 to	be	drawing	or	urging	us	 to	draw	moral	 lessons	
from	 the	 traditional	 society,	 then,	 that	 would	 not	 necessarily	
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suggest	that	he	or	she	expects	the	average	urban	dweller	to	possess	
a communitarian identity in advance. Even in a rural setting, not 
everyone achieves or cares to achieve a communitarian identity of 
personhood.
	 Nevertheless,	Matolino’s	Personhood in African philosophy 
is	educative.	 It	 also	offers	an	 in-depth	analysis	of	 the	concept	of	
personhood.	 It	 is	 a	book	 that	ought	 to	be	 read	by	 researchers	on	
African philosophy, religion, and society.
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